



Master of Its Own Case: EEOC Investigations 
after Issuing a Right-to-sue Notice 
Eric E. Petry† 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for 
enforcing the full arsenal of federal employment discrimination laws. But in addi-
tion to vindicating the rights of employment discrimination victims, the EEOC also 
serves as a gatekeeper to screen claims before they get to court. As part of that gate-
keeping function, Congress requires that individuals alleging employment discrim-
ination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must obtain permission from 
the EEOC before they can bring legal action on their own.  
Title VII’s text leaves the EEOC’s role after issuing a right-to-sue notice ambig-
uous. Despite this ambiguity, or perhaps because of it, the EEOC promulgated 29 
CFR § 1601.28(a)(3), which interprets Title VII as allowing the agency to continue 
its investigation when it would further the broad antidiscrimination mission Congress 
tasked it to carry out. The EEOC typically terminates its investigation after it issues 
a right-to-sue notice. But the times it has continued to investigate, the EEOC often 
has faced litigation challenging its statutory authority to do so.  
The circuit courts to confront the ambiguity regarding the EEOC’s authority 
in this context have come to conflicting results. On one side, the Fifth Circuit has 
held that the issuance of a right-to-sue notice strips the EEOC of its authority to 
investigate. On the other, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that the EEOC 
not only retains its authority to investigate employment discrimination claims after 
issuing a right-to-sue notice, but that continued investigations promote the broad 
purposes of Title VII. 
This Comment addresses this unresolved question through the lens of judicial 
deference to administrative agencies, a doctrine that the circuit courts largely have 
ignored. Applying the two-step analysis from Chevron, this Comment first argues 
that the text of Title VII is ambiguous and that Congress intended to give the agency 
the authority to interpret the statute’s procedural provisions. It then argues that 
§ 1601.28(a)(3) is both procedural and a reasonable interpretation of Title VII and 
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INTRODUCTION 
Often dismissed as a second-class agency with little power,1 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) actu-
ally plays a crucial role in antidiscrimination efforts and is tasked 
with enforcing every employment discrimination statute in the 
federal arsenal.2 Chief among the EEOC’s responsibilities is its 
 
 1 See Theodore W. Wern, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil 
Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 Ohio St L J 
1533, 1584 (1999). 
 2 See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 
74 Fordham L Rev 1937, 1941 (2006). See also Laws Enforced by EEOC (Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission), archived at http://perma.cc/KG89-FYSF. 
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mandate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 to elimi-
nate employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.4 The ability to investigate charges of 
discrimination is central to this mission and is among the EEOC’s 
most potent weapons. 
A circuit split recently deepened regarding the scope of the 
EEOC’s investigative authority. Under Title VII, the EEOC has 
exclusive authority over employment discrimination charges for 
180 days after a charge is filed or until it issues a right-to-sue 
notice to the charging individual.5 That means the aggrieved in-
dividual can bring a private civil action only after requesting and 
receiving a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC.6 The circuit split 
concerns whether the EEOC maintains the authority to investi-
gate after it issues a right-to-sue notice.7 
Only a few circuit courts have addressed this issue, but it has 
potentially serious implications for how the EEOC approaches 
charges of employment discrimination, what tools remain availa-
ble to it, and how effective those tools are at policing discrimina-
tion. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which pre-
venting the EEOC from investigating claims after it issues a 
right-to-sue notice would allow employment discrimination to re-
main undiscovered and unaddressed. 
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. After being de-
nied a promotion in favor of a more junior and less qualified 
coworker, an employee files a charge of discrimination with the 
EEOC. Not only was the employer’s decision, in fact, based on dis-
criminatory animus, but its discriminatory practices have also 
impacted a number of other similarly situated employees. As re-
quired by statute, the EEOC notifies the employer of the charge 
and begins its investigation.8 But at the end of the statutorily 
mandated 180-day period of exclusive jurisdiction,9 the EEOC has 
not yet finished its investigation due to the complexity of the case 
and, more importantly, the employer’s uncooperative and ob-
structive conduct. Typically, the charging individual in this situ-
ation does not immediately request a right-to-sue notice because 
she has an incentive to let the agency pursue the claim with its 
 
 3 Pub L No 88-352, § 705(a), 78 Stat 241 (1964), codified at 42 USC §§ 2000e–2000e-17. 
 4 See 42 USC § 2000e-2. 
 5 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). See also note 35 and accompanying text. 
 6 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 7 See Part II. 
 8 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(b). 
 9 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
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resources.10 But here, the employer understands that it could face 
serious liability if the EEOC investigation exposes the full 
breadth of its discriminatory practices. To avoid liability, the em-
ployer offers the charging individual a lucrative settlement if she 
agrees to demand a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. In this 
scenario, if the right-to-sue notice strips the EEOC of its ability 
to continue investigating, the Commission will fail in its duty to 
protect the public interest against employment discrimination be-
cause it will be unable to uncover the systemic pattern of discrim-
ination.11 
This Comment argues that the EEOC’s authority to investi-
gate claims of employment discrimination extends beyond, and is 
unaffected by, the issuance of a right-to-sue notice to the charging 
individual. Evaluating the EEOC’s Title VII authority through 
the lens of judicial deference to administrative agencies under the 
framework established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc12 confirms this position.13 Although the text 
of Title VII and its legislative history suggest no temporal re-
straint on the EEOC’s investigatory power, Congress did not de-
finitively speak to the question.14 Given this statutory ambiguity 
and the EEOC’s regulatory interpretations, analysis of deference 
under Chevron is essential to resolving this question. Yet, sur-
prisingly, the circuit courts involved in this debate have not con-
sidered whether deference is appropriate.15 By relocating the de-
bate, this Comment demonstrates that the EEOC properly 
interpreted its investigatory authority under Title VII and that 
courts should defer to the EEOC’s position. 
 
 10 Interview with Randall D. Schmidt, Clinical Professor of Law, The University of 
Chicago Law School (Nov 7, 2017) (“Schmidt Interview”) (on file with author). 
 11 See General Telephone Co of the Northwest v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 446 US 318, 326 (1980) (explaining that, “[w]hen the EEOC acts, albeit at 
the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public 
interest in preventing employment discrimination”). This concern is even more pressing 
because of restrictions that prevent the EEOC from releasing certain information from its 
charge files. See 5 USC § 552; 29 CFR § 1610.17(e) (“[N]othing said or done during and as 
a part of the Commission’s endeavors to eliminate any alleged unlawful employment prac-
tice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion may be made public 
by the Commission without the written consent of the parties concerned.”). For example, 
the details of “[a] charging party’s file may not be disclosed to other charging parties, be-
cause they are members of the public with respect to that charge.” 1 EEOC Compliance 
Manual ¶ 1785, § 83.5 (2017), available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 6879801. 
 12 467 US 837 (1984). 
 13 See id at 866. 
 14 See Part III.A.5. 
 15 See Part II. 
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The remainder of this Comment proceeds as follows: Part I 
discusses the history and creation of the EEOC, the steady expan-
sion of its authority over time through legislation and court opin-
ions, the current state of the EEOC’s authority under Title VII, 
and EEOC interpretations of that power. Part II examines the 
circuit split that has developed regarding the EEOC’s authority 
to investigate claims after the issuance of a right-to-sue notice 
and identifies a key issue left unaddressed by the courts: judicial 
deference to administrative agencies. Finally, Part III relocates 
the debate and addresses the agency deference question to fill the 
analytical gaps left by the circuit split before examining the issue 
in light of the broad purpose of Title VII. This analysis concludes 
that the EEOC maintains the authority to investigate a claim of 
employment discrimination even after it issues a right-to-sue no-
tice to the charging individual. 
I.  EEOC ENFORCEMENT POWER UNDER TITLE VII 
Since the circuit split at the heart of this Comment centers on 
how to interpret the EEOC’s enforcement authority under Title VII, 
this Part first provides an overview of the statutes and regula-
tions that make up the legal background of the dispute. Compared 
with other agencies, the EEOC historically has been viewed as a 
“toothless, . . . poor, enfeebled thing.”16 But while the EEOC lacks 
the same level of independent enforcement authority that other 
agencies enjoy, it nonetheless has great responsibility. History 
shows that Congress steadily expanded the scope of the EEOC’s 
powers over time, and court decisions have consistently affirmed 
its important role as the preeminent enforcer of the federal gov-
ernment’s antidiscrimination regime. Part I.A examines this his-
tory, tracing the expansion of the EEOC’s power over time as Con-
gress enacted legislation to increase its role in combating 
employment discrimination. Part I.B presents an overview of the 
EEOC’s current enforcement process under Title VII. It high-
lights the ways in which Congress has both empowered and re-
stricted the EEOC and discusses several key Supreme Court de-
cisions that interpreted Title VII. Finally, Part I.C analyzes the 
EEOC’s narrow rulemaking authority, and Part I.D examines the 
 
 16 Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination 
Policy: Recognizing the Agency’s Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 Utah L 
Rev 51, 56 (1995). 
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EEOC regulation—which lies at the heart of the circuit split—
interpreting its investigatory power under Title VII. 
A. Creation of the EEOC and Subsequent Expansions of 
Authority 
Congress created the EEOC when it enacted Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The new agency was tasked with ad-
dressing employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, sex, or religion.17 The scope of this mission in-
cluded both individual claims of discrimination as well as more 
systemic patterns.18 
But despite the lofty antidiscrimination goals that animated 
the creation of the EEOC, Congress initially gave it very little 
power to police discrimination.19 As originally enacted, Title VII 
placed severe substantive and procedural limitations on the 
EEOC. While it could investigate wrongdoing and engage in con-
ciliation efforts, it had no independent authority to bring law-
suits.20 In stark contrast, the bill that was originally introduced 
envisioned a version of the EEOC with broad adjudicatory and 
enforcement powers.21 But the need for political compromises to 
move the bill through the legislative process led to the removal of 
most of the EEOC’s enforcement power.22 The only tools Congress 
left the EEOC were processing complaints, attempting to foster 
conciliation, and recommending civil action to the attorney gen-
eral if it found evidence of a pattern or practice of employment 
discrimination.23 Thus, Title VII’s original statutory scheme left 
the power to resolve claims in the hands of courts via lawsuits 
brought by individuals and the Department of Justice.24 
 
 17 See 42 USC §§ 2000e-2–2000e-5. 
 18 See Donald R. Livingston and Reed L. Russell, EEOC Litigation and Charge En-
forcement 9–10 (Bloomberg BNA 2d ed 2014). 
 19 See id at 10. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See HR 7152, 88th Cong, 1st Sess, in 109 Cong Rec 11252 (June 20, 1963) (“It shall 
be the function of the [EEOC] to prevent discrimination against employees . . . because of 
race, color, religion, or national origin. . . . The [EEOC] shall have such powers to effectu-
ate the purposes of this title.”). 
 22 Livingston and Russell, EEOC Litigation and Charge Enforcement at 6–9 (cited in 
note 18). 
 23 Id at 9–10. 
 24 Id at 10. 
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Congress substantially expanded the EEOC’s powers with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.25 Most im-
portantly, the 1972 amendments to Title VII vested independent 
enforcement power in the EEOC, allowing it to bring lawsuits on 
behalf of individuals harmed by employment discrimination.26 The 
Act also extended Title VII to cover state and local employees, au-
thorized appointment of an EEOC general counsel to conduct liti-
gation under Title VII, and transferred authority to pursue pattern 
and practice litigation from the attorney general to the EEOC.27 
The EEOC’s powers continued to expand gradually over the 
next several decades. Six years after Congress passed the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, President Jimmy Carter 
signed an executive order28 making the EEOC responsible for en-
forcing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act29 (ADEA). 
Then, in 1990, Congress passed legislation placing the EEOC in 
charge of enforcing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act30 
(ADA). This final expansion of power consolidated the EEOC’s au-
thority to police all forms of employment discrimination pro-
scribed by federal law.31 
B. Current EEOC Enforcement Procedure 
The current enforcement process under Title VII consists of 
four stages: filing and notice of charge, investigation, conference 
and conciliation, and enforcement. Courts disagree over how to 
interpret the interaction between these stages, which has re-
sulted in the circuit split at the heart of this Comment. While 
Parts II and III discuss this disagreement in more detail, this Sec-
tion provides an overview of the EEOC’s enforcement process as 
it is currently enumerated in Title VII.32 
 
 25 Pub L No 92-261, 86 Stat 103, codified in various sections of Titles 5 and 42. 
 26 White, 1995 Utah L Rev at 66 (cited in note 16). 
 27 Livingston and Russell, EEOC Litigation and Charge Resolution at 12 (cited in 
note 18). 
 28 Executive Order 12144 (1979), 3 CFR 404. 
 29 Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602 (1967), codified at 29 USC §§ 621–633a. 
 30 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified at 42 USC §§ 12111–17. 
 31 See Hart, 74 Fordham L Rev at 1941 (cited in note 2). 
 32 Title VII envisions a role for state and local government agencies in combating 
employment discrimination. See 42 USC § 2000e-5(c)–(d). The provisions requiring coop-
eration between the EEOC and state and local agencies, though important to the statutory 
scheme, are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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1. Filing and notice of charge. 
EEOC involvement begins when an aggrieved individual, a 
person acting on behalf of an aggrieved individual, or an EEOC 
commissioner files a formal charge of unlawful employment dis-
crimination with the agency.33 This step triggers the EEOC’s au-
thority and is significant because aggrieved individuals cannot 
pursue private legal action until first exhausting the administra-
tive procedures and receiving a right-to-sue notice from the 
EEOC.34 The individual must file her charge with the EEOC 
within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.35 
Within ten days of the charge being filed, the EEOC is required 
to “serve a notice of the charge” on the employer or entity against 
whom the charge was filed.36 
Two aspects of the structure Congress established for trigger-
ing EEOC authority are worth emphasizing. First, the dual mech-
anism by which charges can be filed reflects the “dual role” of the 
EEOC, which “requires it to wear both the hat of the individual 
and that of the government.”37 In other words, the EEOC is tasked 
with acting as a clearinghouse to evaluate and vindicate individ-
ual claims of employment discrimination for individual victims, 
but it is also responsible for addressing more widespread and sys-
temic patterns and practices of discrimination. Commissioner’s 
 
 33 See 42 USC §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-6(e). Commissioner’s charges can originate as a rec-
ommendation from an EEOC field office or from a commissioner herself. For a discussion of 
the process by which a commissioner’s charge is filed, see Advancing Opportunity: A Review 
of the Systemic Program of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, July 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6288-MZDU. 
 34 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). See also Livingston and Russell, EEOC Litigation and 
Charge Enforcement at 142 n 1 (cited in note 18) (“A charging party must obtain a notice of 
right to sue [from the EEOC] as a predicate to a Title VII . . . lawsuit.”); Robert A. Kearney, 
Who’s “in Charge” at the EEOC?, 50 Drake L Rev 1, 5 n 24 (2001) (“A number of Supreme 
Court decisions, in dicta, support the proposition that the 180-day timeline under § 2000e-
5(f)(1) is a jurisdictional waiting period in which the EEOC has exclusive jurisdiction.”). 
 35 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(1). The filing deadline varies depending on the existence 
of work-sharing agreements between the EEOC and state or local antidiscrimination 
agencies. See 42 USC § 2000e-5(e)(1). However, these distinctions are not relevant here. 
 36 42 USC § 2000e-5(b). 
 37 Michelle Hartmann, Comment, A Myriad of Contradiction with Title VII Arbitra-
tion Agreements–Duffield as the Past, Austin as the Future, and the EEOC as the Target 
of Restructuring, 54 SMU L Rev 359, 390–91 (2001). See also Elizabeth Penn, Book Re-
view, Disability Civil Rights Law & Policy, 75 Miss L J 1085, 1093 n 32 (2006) (“The EEOC 
has dual goals—to make the individual whole and to vindicate the wrong in the public 
interest.”). 
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charges typically are used only to address systemic issues.38 Indi-
vidual claims, on the other hand, can—and often do—implicate 
both of these goals.39 In such instances, the EEOC faces the diffi-
cult challenge of balancing the interests of the individual in vin-
dicating her claim against the agency’s overriding interest in pro-
tecting society writ large by eradicating impermissible 
employment practices for good.40 
Second, the filing requirement under Title VII places a sig-
nificant restriction on the EEOC’s power. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has rejected EEOC attempts to address alleged discrimina-
tion prior to the filing of a charge, holding that the existence of a 
valid charge is “a jurisdictional prerequisite” to EEOC author-
ity.41 Thus, unlike many other administrative agencies that enjoy 
broad power to investigate and enforce on their own initiative, the 
EEOC “does not possess plenary authority to demand infor-
mation” from employers absent a charge.42 In theory, this limita-
tion poses no more than a minor hurdle because the EEOC has 
the ability to issue a commissioner’s charge if it suspects unlawful 
employment practices may be occurring, thereby triggering its 
authority under Title VII.43 But in practice, commissioner’s 
charges are rarely used.44 
 
 38 Livingston and Russell, EEOC Litigation and Charge Enforcement at 285 (cited in 
note 18). 
 39 See General Telephone, 446 US at 326 (explaining that, “[w]hen the EEOC acts, 
albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate 
the public interest in preventing employment discrimination”). 
 40 There are many reasons an individual’s interest in speedy resolution of her dispute 
might conflict with the public’s interest in eliminating systemic discrimination. For exam-
ple, in the class-action context, the EEOC “represents the public interest, not any partic-
ular private interest, when it sues in its own name. Potential conflicts within the group 
are addressed by allowing private parties to intervene, rather than by imposing a require-
ment of adequacy of representation.” Pauline T. Kim, Addressing Systemic Discrimina-
tion: Public Enforcement and the Role of the EEOC, 95 BU L Rev 1133, 1138–39 (2015) 
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court has long been sensitive to the difficulties the EEOC 
faces in trying to juggle these interests. See, for example, General Telephone, 446 US at 
331 (noting that “[t]he EEOC exists to advance the public interest in preventing and rem-
edying employment discrimination, and it does so in part by making the hard choices 
where conflicts of interest exist”). 
 41 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Shell Oil Co, 466 US 54, 65 (1984). 
 42 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Hearst Co, 103 F3d 462, 464 (5th 
Cir 1997). 
 43 See note 33 and accompanying text. 
 44 See Nancy M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63 SMU L Rev 1237, 1272 n 312 
(2010) (noting that “[c]ommissioner’s charges are very rare” because authority to bring 
such charges lies solely with the most senior EEOC officials); Livingston and Russell, 
EEOC Litigation and Charge Enforcement at 281 (cited in note 18) (“Nearly all [EEOC] 
investigations start with a charge of discrimination filed by an individual charging 
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2. Investigation. 
Once a charge is filed and the employer is notified, Title VII 
requires the EEOC to “make an investigation thereof” to deter-
mine whether the charge is supported by sufficient evidence.45 
The EEOC must complete its investigation “as promptly as possi-
ble and, so far as practicable, not later than one hundred and 
twenty days from the filing of the charge.”46 Although this lan-
guage would seem to restrict the amount of time the EEOC can 
investigate, the Supreme Court refuses to interpret Title VII as 
placing a strict time limit on EEOC investigations.47 Similarly, 
the Supreme Court has adopted a very broad reading of the 
EEOC’s subpoena powers under Title VII. Although the EEOC is 
entitled only to evidence that is “relevant to the charge under in-
vestigation,”48 the Supreme Court has construed the term “rele-
vant” very “generously,” allowing the EEOC to obtain “virtually 
any material that might cast light on the allegations against the 
employer.”49 
If the EEOC investigation does not find sufficient evidence of 
a violation to constitute reasonable cause, it must dismiss the 
charge and notify the parties of its determination.50 After receiv-
ing notice of the EEOC’s determination, the aggrieved party re-
tains the right to file a private civil action against the employer.51 
In practice, the EEOC often will contact the individual before an-
nouncing that the investigation revealed insufficient evidence to 
find cause.52 This advance warning allows the individual to re-
quest a right-to-sue notice before the EEOC issues its determina-
tion, thereby preventing publication of the EEOC’s findings. 
 
party.”). Between 2002 and 2015, the EEOC issued a total of 177 commissioner’s charges. 
Advancing Opportunity (cited in note 33). By contrast, the EEOC processed 1.2 million 
individual charges during that timeframe. Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC): 
FY 1997 through FY 2016 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Jan 18, 2017), 
archived at http://perma.cc/32QB-97JG. 
 45 42 USC § 2000e-5(b). 
 46 42 USC § 2000e-5(b). 
 47 See Occidental Life Insurance Co of California v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 432 US 355, 361 (1977) (asserting that there is “little support” for the prop-
osition that Title VII places a time limit on EEOC actions). See also Livingston and Russell, 
EEOC Litigation and Charge Enforcement at 223 (cited in note 18) (“[T]he courts have 
placed no restrictions on the duration of an EEOC investigation.”). 
 48 42 USC § 2000e-8(a). 
 49 McLane Co v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 137 S Ct 1159, 1169 
(2017), quoting Shell Oil, 466 US at 68–69. 
 50 42 USC § 2000e-5(b). 
 51 See 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). See also Shell Oil, 466 US at 64 n 13. 
 52 Schmidt Interview (cited in note 10). 
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From the individual’s perspective, this is desirable: since the in-
vestigation did not find cause, the employer could have inter-
preted the EEOC’s determination as a sign that the employee’s 
case is weak, which the employer could then use against the indi-
vidual in subsequent litigation or settlement negotiations.53 
3. Conference and conciliation. 
If the EEOC does find sufficient evidence to support the indi-
vidual’s claim, it must attempt “to eliminate any such alleged un-
lawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.”54 In fact, Title VII imposes a thirty-
day period after the charge is filed during which legal action is 
prohibited, leaving informal methods of conciliation and persua-
sion as the only tools available during that time.55 
Conference and conciliation—an informal and confidential 
process in which the EEOC works with the parties to find a vol-
untary resolution56—is the heart of the Title VII enforcement re-
gime.57 Courts have repeatedly noted that “Congress chose coop-
eration and voluntary compliance as its preferred means” to 
eliminate employment discrimination.58 To encourage open and 
honest conciliation efforts from parties on both sides, Congress 
required that all informal proceedings remain confidential and 
imposed punishments for any violations.59 It is only after informal 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 42 USC § 2000e-5(b). See also 29 CFR §§ 1601.20, 1601.24(a). 
 55 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 56 See What You Should Know: The EEOC, Conciliation, and Litigation (Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission), archived at http://perma.cc/7ST2-D93X.  
 57 See Elizabeth Dunn, Comment, No Longer a Paper Tiger: The EEOC and Its Statu-
tory Duty to Conciliate, 63 Emory L J 455, 473 (2013) (noting that “Title VII imposes a frame-
work that encourages conciliation in lieu of litigation”). Indeed, one circuit court has found 
the conciliation process to be of such primary importance that it banned the practice of 
early right-to-sue notices, by which the EEOC would issue a right-to-sue notice before 
conducting an investigation or attempting conciliation efforts. See Martini v Federal National 
Mortgage Association, 178 F3d 1336, 1338 (DC Cir 1999). Other circuits have adopted the 
opposite view, however, creating a circuit split. See Bryant v California Brewers Association, 
585 F2d 421, 425 (9th Cir 1978) (holding that the EEOC can issue a right-to-sue notice 
before the expiration of the 180-day period); Sims v Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F3d 1059, 
1061 (11th Cir 1994) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s position). The circuit split over 
early right-to-sue notices lies beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 58 Mach Mining, LLC v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 135 S Ct 1645, 
1651 (2015), quoting Ford Motor Co v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 458 
US 219, 228 (1982) (quotation marks omitted). 
 59 42 USC § 2000e-5(b) (“Nothing said or done during and as a part of such informal 
endeavors may be made public. . . . Any person who makes public information in violation 
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means have failed that the EEOC can consider initiating legal ac-
tion.60 Still, the EEOC has “extensive discretion to determine the 
kind and amount” of conciliation efforts that are sufficient to sat-
isfy the statutory mandate.61 
4. Enforcement. 
If the EEOC finds cause to support the claim and is unable to 
resolve the issue through conciliation, it has the option to bring a 
civil action against the employer or allow the aggrieved individual 
to do so on her own.62 If the EEOC initiates an individual lawsuit, it 
seeks redress on behalf of the charging individual.63 But because 
charges often implicate broader systemic concerns, the EEOC 
also uses litigation based on individual charges to further the 
public interest in rooting out and eliminating discriminatory em-
ployment practices, which gives rise to potential conflicts between 
the EEOC’s dueling roles.64 To alleviate this concern, Congress 
gave aggrieved individuals a statutory right to intervene in suits 
brought by the EEOC.65 Congress also provided a mechanism for 
the aggrieved individual to sue on her own if the EEOC finds suf-
ficient evidence but decides not to pursue legal action. When this 
situation arises, typically due to agency resource constraints, the 
charging individual can bring a private civil action after requesting 
and receiving a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC.66 When an in-
dividual files a lawsuit pursuant to a right-to-sue notice, the EEOC 
can intervene only at the court’s discretion.67 
Title VII also allows the charging individual to demand a 
right-to-sue notice if the EEOC fails to complete its investigation 
 
of this subsection shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one 
year, or both.”). 
 60 Over the past decade, the EEOC has conducted an average of 944 conciliations per 
year. All Statutes (Charges Filed with EEOC) (cited in note 44). During that time, roughly 
33 percent of conciliation efforts were successful, though the annual rate varied from a low 
of 26 percent in 2010 to a high of 41 percent in 2013. Id. By contrast, the success rate for 
conciliation efforts in systemic investigations over the past decade increased from just 21 
percent in 2007 to a whopping 64 percent in 2015. See Advancing Opportunity (cited in 
note 33).  
 61 Mach Mining, 135 S Ct at 1649. 
 62 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 63 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Waffle House, Inc, 534 US 279, 307 
n 9 (2002) (Thomas dissenting) (“The EEOC has consistently recognized that the Commission 
represents individual employees when it files an action in court.”).  
 64 See notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 65 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 66 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 67 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
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within 180 days of the filing of the charge.68 This mechanism arose 
out of Congress’s concern that “the heavy caseload of the EEOC 
could result in delays unacceptable to aggrieved persons.”69 The 
180-day limitation prevents unreasonable delays by allowing an 
aggrieved individual to bypass the agency’s backlog by taking the 
information from the EEOC’s investigation and pursuing legal ac-
tion on her own. 
But this private action mechanism does not supplant the 
EEOC’s authority to bring a suit. The Supreme Court established 
this point firmly in Occidental Life Insurance Co of California v 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,70 a leading case in-
terpreting the EEOC’s enforcement authority. The dispute in 
Occidental arose when the EEOC brought a lawsuit three years 
after the charge was filed and five months after conciliation ef-
forts broke down.71 The employer challenged the EEOC’s author-
ity to bring a lawsuit after such long delays, arguing that Title VII 
should be read to impose a 180-day limitation on the EEOC’s 
power to bring a suit. The Court rejected this interpretation, not-
ing that “neither [§] 706(f) nor any other section of the Act explic-
itly requires the EEOC to conclude its conciliation efforts and 
bring an enforcement suit within any maximum period of time.”72 
The Court has continued to build on Occidental’s broad view of 
EEOC enforcement powers in subsequent cases.73 
C. EEOC Rulemaking Authority 
Under Title VII, the EEOC can only “issue, amend, or rescind 
suitable procedural regulations” necessary to carry out the stat-
ute.74 The Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’s restrictive 
 
 68 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 69 Occidental, 432 US at 364. See also S Rep No 92-415, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 23 (1971): 
[W]here the Commission is not able to pursue a complaint with satisfactory 
speed, or enters into an agreement which is not acceptable to the aggrieved 
party, the bill provides that the individual shall have an opportunity to seek his 
own remedy, even though he may have originally submitted his charge to the 
Commission. 
 70 432 US 355 (1977). 
 71 Id at 357–58. 
 72 Id at 360. 
 73 See, for example, Waffle House, 534 US at 288 (holding that the EEOC retains the 
authority to sue despite the existence of an arbitration agreement between the employer 
and the aggrieved individual). 
 74 42 USC § 2000e-12(a). Other statutes the EEOC is charged with enforcing provide 
broader rulemaking authority. See Hart, 74 Fordham L Rev at 1941–42 (cited in note 2). 
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delegation of rulemaking authority to mean that the EEOC lacks 
power to issue substantive rules and has struck down the EEOC’s 
attempts to interpret Title VII’s substantive provisions.75 By con-
trast, the Supreme Court has been willing to uphold the EEOC’s 
procedural regulations in several cases.76 
This distinction is centrally important to this Comment be-
cause it raises questions about what constitutes procedure as op-
posed to substance in the Title VII context77 and how much defer-
ence courts should give to the EEOC’s rules concerning the 
former. As Part III.A discusses, courts will defer to an adminis-
trative agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute under 
Chevron if the agency’s interpretation is reasonable and adopted 
through a valid regulation carrying the force of law. 
D. The EEOC’s Interpretation of Its Investigatory Powers 
In 1974, the EEOC promulgated a final regulation following 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3), author-
izing it to continue investigating a charge even after issuing a 
right-to-sue notice to the aggrieved individual. Although contin-
ued investigations after the issuance of a right-to-sue notice are 
not meant to be the norm, § 1601.28(a)(3) reflects the EEOC’s 
view that investigations should remain open when it serves the 
purposes of Title VII. The regulation states: 
Issuance of a notice of right to sue shall terminate further pro-
ceeding of any charge that is not a Commissioner charge un-
less . . . [specified EEOC officials] determine[ ] at that time or 
 
But since the circuit split addressed in Part II deals only with enforcement of Title VII, 
those statutes fall beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 75 See General Electric Co v Gilbert, 429 US 125, 141 (1976) (noting that “Congress, 
in enacting Title VII, did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or reg-
ulations pursuant to that Title”); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian 
American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 257 (1991) (applying the General Electric framework to 
reject the EEOC’s substantive interpretation of Title VII). 
 76 See, for example, Edelman v Lynchburg College, 535 US 106, 113 (2002) (holding 
that the EEOC’s regulation did not impermissibly address “a substantive issue over which 
the EEOC has no rulemaking power” but rather fell within “its authority to adopt suitable 
procedural regulations”); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Commercial Office 
Products Co, 486 US 107, 125 (1988) (O’Connor concurring) (“[D]eference is particularly 
appropriate on this type of technical issue of agency procedure.”). 
 77 The discussion of procedure and substance in this Comment is confined narrowly 
to the Title VII context. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) similarly distinguishes 
between procedure and substance. See, for example, 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(A). But the APA 
understanding of these terms is distinct from the Title VII understanding. This Comment 
concerns only the Title VII understanding and does not implicate the APA notions of pro-
cedure and substance. 
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at a later time that it would effectuate the purpose of title VII, 
the ADA, or GINA [Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act] to further process the charge. Issuance of a notice of right 
to sue shall not terminate the processing of a Commissioner 
charge.78 
The EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII, as embodied in 
§ 1601.28(a)(3), is the lynchpin to the issues raised in this Comment. 
If the regulation is entitled to Chevron deference, that resolves 
the circuit split discussed in Part II. And given that the EEOC is 
permitted to engage in rulemaking only on procedural issues,79 
the EEOC’s position deserves Chevron deference only if 
§ 1601.28(a)(3) is procedural. But curiously, the courts that have 
considered whether the issuance of a right-to-sue notice termi-
nates the EEOC’s investigatory powers have not directly dis-
cussed these questions. The next Part explores why. 
II.  CONTROVERSY OVER POST–RIGHT-TO-SUE NOTICE 
INVESTIGATIONS: EEOC TREATMENT IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 
Several circuit courts have come to different conclusions re-
garding whether the EEOC can continue to investigate a charge 
of discrimination after it issues a right-to-sue notice to the ag-
grieved individual. This Part analyzes each of the three cases that 
form this circuit split and begins to relocate the debate to address 
the important administrative law question that the courts so far 
have neglected: whether the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII, 
as expressed in § 1601.28(a)(3), is entitled to Chevron deference. 
A. The Fifth Circuit and Hearst 
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Hearst 
Corp,80 the Fifth Circuit held that the EEOC’s authority to inves-
tigate terminates when it issues a right-to-sue letter. The issue in 
Hearst arose after two employees of the Houston Chronicle filed 
a charge with the EEOC against the company’s vice president of 
 
 78 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3). The EEOC reiterates this position in its compliance man-
ual. See 1 EEOC Compliance Manual ¶ 324, § 6.4(e) (2017), available on Westlaw at 2015 
WL 6878602 (stating that investigations can continue “when the [district director] other-
wise determines that continued action would effectuate the purposes of Title VII/ADA”). 
 79 See Part I.C. 
 80 103 F3d 462 (5th Cir 1997). 
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sales and marketing alleging sexual harassment and discrimina-
tion.81 The EEOC began to investigate the claims, but the ag-
grieved individuals requested a right-to-sue notice before the in-
vestigation concluded.82 The EEOC granted the plaintiffs’ right-
to-sue notices but refused to withdraw subpoenas it had previ-
ously issued demanding documents from the company.83 The 
Chronicle’s parent company, the Hearst Corporation, refused to 
comply with the subpoenas, and the EEOC sued in federal district 
court to have them enforced.84 The district court enforced the sub-
poenas and ordered Hearst to turn over its documents, but the 
Fifth Circuit reversed on appeal.85 
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis drew heavily on the language 
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Occidental. After lamenting 
the fact that Occidental rendered Title VII’s “180-day period . . . 
practically meaningless,”86 the court went on to emphasize that, 
in Occidental, the Supreme Court described the enforcement pro-
cedure under Title VII as a “multistage scheme” involving “a se-
quential series of steps”87 that fall “into four distinct stages: filing 
and notice of charge, investigation, conference and conciliation, 
and finally, enforcement.”88 The Fifth Circuit took this to mean 
that Congress “deliberately divided [Title VII’s enforcement pro-
cedure] into distinct stages” that should be completed one after 
the other in a nonoverlapping series.89 And although the court 
acknowledged that “Congress granted the EEOC broad investiga-
tory authority,”90 it held that such power was strictly confined 
within the investigation stage. In other words, the court said that 
once the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice, “the time for investi-
gation has passed.”91 At that point, the EEOC can only “intervene 
[in the individual’s lawsuit] and pursue discovery through the 
courts” or “file a Commissioner’s charge.”92 
In addition to the Supreme Court’s language from Occidental, 
the Fifth Circuit claimed that its position was “confirmed by the 
 
 81 Id at 463. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id at 463–64. 
 84 Hearst, 103 F3d at 464. 
 85 Id at 469–70. 
 86 Id at 468. 
 87 Id at 469, quoting Occidental, 432 US at 372. 
 88 Hearst, 103 F3d at 468. 
 89 Id at 469. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id (emphasis omitted). 
 92 Hearst, 103 F3d at 469. 
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legislative history of the 1972 amendments” to Title VII.93 Quot-
ing snippets from the Congressional Record, the court stated that: 
A Senate Conference Report indicates that the amendments 
retained the previous structure that “enable[d] the EEOC to 
process a charge of employment discrimination through the 
investigation and conciliation stages,” but additionally au-
thorized the EEOC to go further and file a civil action “if it 
has been unable to eliminate an alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice by informal methods.”94 
The court did not cite any other legislative history to support 
its interpretation. And although the court did parse the statutory 
text earlier in its opinion, that analysis focused on Title VII’s 180-
day limit rather than on how a right-to-sue notice impacts the 
EEOC’s investigatory authority.95 The court’s misplaced focus—
and the fact that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation directly con-
tradicted established Supreme Court precedent96—undercuts the 
force of its statutory analysis. 
Curiously, the Hearst court did not cite § 1601.28(a)(3) and 
failed to discuss whether the EEOC’s interpretation merits any 
level of deference.97 As Part III discusses, the only justification for 
this omission would be if the text of Title VII were unambiguous, 
thereby leaving no room for agency interpretation.98 But the Fifth 
Circuit did not explicitly make that ruling. Instead, the court 
seems to have implicitly held that the text of Title VII unambig-
uously prohibits the EEOC from continuing its investigation after 
issuing a right-to-sue notice. Without more textual support, the 
conclusion that Congress intended “distinct” stages of Title VII 
enforcement is not obvious. 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id, quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972—Conference Report, 92d 
Cong, 2d Sess, in 118 Cong Rec 7167 (Mar 6, 1972). 
 95 Hearst, 103 F3d at 467 (explaining that Title VII’s 180-day language should be 
interpreted as a strict outer limit to EEOC involvement). 
 96 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court’s decision in Occidental 
preempted its preferred interpretation of Title VII. See Hearst, 103 F3d at 467–68. Yet 
rather than reengage with the statutory text in light of the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion, the Fifth Circuit claimed Occidental was distinguishable and advanced the same logic 
underlying its preferred interpretation. 
 97 This is curious because § 1601.28(a)(3) had been on the books for more than twenty 
years, Chevron was decided thirteen years earlier, and the question of deference arose 
during briefing. See Reply Brief of Appellant, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
v Hearst Corp, No 96-20042, *13 (5th Cir filed July 3, 1996). 
 98 See text accompanying notes 149–50. 
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B. The Ninth Circuit and Federal Express 
More than a decade later, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Fifth 
Circuit’s conclusion and created a circuit split when it decided 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Federal Express 
Corp.99 In Federal Express, a FedEx employee filed a claim on be-
half of himself and similarly situated minority employees alleging 
racial discrimination in the company’s promotion and career ad-
vancement practices.100 Like in Hearst, the EEOC granted the 
plaintiff a right-to-sue notice but continued its investigation.101 As 
part of its investigation, the EEOC issued subpoenas to FedEx 
and tried to have them enforced in federal district court after 
FedEx refused to comply.102 The district court sided with the 
EEOC, just as the district court did in Hearst.103 But this time, the 
court of appeals affirmed the decision.104 
In affirming the lower court, the Ninth Circuit adopted a dif-
ferent approach to judicial review in EEOC subpoena enforcement 
cases than the Fifth Circuit. The court held that judicial inquiry in 
such cases should be “quite narrow” and consider “(1) whether 
Congress has granted the authority to investigate” and “(2) whether 
procedural requirements have been followed.”105 Given the 
“strictly limited role” for courts in reviewing agency subpoena re-
quests,106 the Ninth Circuit said that the first factor is satisfied as 
long as the EEOC has “a plausible basis for jurisdiction.”107 Turn-
ing to the second factor, the court discussed the enforcement proce-
dures laid out in Title VII and emphasized that the EEOC’s inter-
pretation of § 1601.28(a)(3) allowed it to continue investigating after 
issuing a right-to-sue notice.108 This interpretation controlled, the 
court said, because it was not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.”109 Note, however, that the court considered 
 
 99 558 F3d 842 (9th Cir 2009). 
 100 Id at 845. 
 101 Id at 845–46. 
 102 Id at 846. 
 103 Federal Express, 558 F3d at 846. 
 104 Id at 856. 
 105 Id at 848, quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Karuk Tribe 
Housing Authority, 260 F3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir 2001). 
 106 Federal Express, 558 F3d at 848, quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
v Children’s Hospital Medical Center of Northern California, 719 F2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir 
1983) (quotation marks omitted). 
 107 Federal Express, 558 F3d at 849. 
 108 Id at 850 (discussing 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3) and the EEOC’s Compliance Manual). 
 109 Id at 850 n 2, quoting Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452, 461 (1997). Courts routinely 
defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. See, for example, Perez v Mortgage 
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only the permissibility of the agency’s interpretation of 
§ 1601.28(a)(3) and not its interpretation of Title VII. 
The Ninth Circuit then addressed and explicitly rejected the 
Fifth Circuit’s reading of Title VII on several different grounds. 
First, the court rejected the rigid boundaries the Fifth Circuit 
erected between the various stages of enforcement. Rather than 
a series of “distinct” stages, the Ninth Circuit said they were “in-
tegrated” such that “[t]he fact that one stage of the enforcement 
procedure is going on does not mean that another stage has 
ceased.”110 In support, the court cited the Supreme Court’s holding 
that Title VII gives the EEOC “a broad right of access to relevant 
evidence” to enable it “to make informed decisions at each stage 
of the enforcement process.”111 Second, the Ninth Circuit chafed 
at the notion that “the charging party can, through his or her ac-
tions (that is, by filing suit), divest the EEOC of authority.”112 In-
stead, the court noted that the Supreme Court had declared the 
EEOC the “master of its own case,” meaning the EEOC controls 
the enforcement process regardless of what the aggrieved individual 
does.113 Finally, the court countered the Fifth Circuit’s contention 
that EEOC investigations no longer serve the purpose of Title VII 
after the charging individual files suit. This view, the Ninth Circuit 
held, ignores the fact that EEOC investigations serve a purpose 
beyond redressing individual harms: “The EEOC is not merely a 
proxy for victims of discrimination, but acts also to vindicate the 
public interest in preventing employment discrimination.”114 The 
Ninth Circuit held that this broader purpose could, under certain 
circumstances, necessitate that the EEOC continue an investiga-
tion even after the charging party files suit.115 
 
Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1207 (2015) (“[C]ourts lack authority to impose upon 
[an] agency its own notion of which procedures are best or most likely to further some 
vague, undefined public good.’’) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This doctrine, 
known as Auer deference, does bear on the topic addressed in this Comment but does not 
affect its conclusion. Given courts’ highly deferential approach under Auer and their con-
sistent adherence to the doctrine, it would be an extraordinary surprise if a court refused to 
defer to the EEOC’s interpretation that “further process[ing]” under 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3) 
includes continued investigations after the issuance of a right-to-sue notice. 
 110 Federal Express, 558 F3d at 851 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 111 Id at 851–52, quoting University of Pennsylvania v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 493 US 182, 191 (1990) (emphasis omitted). 
 112 Federal Express, 558 F3d at 852. 
 113 Id at 852, quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Waffle House, 
Inc, 534 US 279, 291–92 (2002). 
 114 Federal Express, 558 F3d at 852, quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
v Goodyear Aerospace Corp, 813 F2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir 1987). 
 115 Federal Express, 558 F3d at 852–53. 
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While the Ninth Circuit’s opinion addressed some of the gaps 
left by Hearst, it still suffers from a major omission. The court 
correctly noted that courts should defer to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own regulation,116 but that question has no bearing on 
whether courts should defer to the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute. By failing to address the latter question, the Ninth Circuit 
in Federal Express did not adequately address the issue of defer-
ence to administrative agencies, just like the Fifth Circuit in 
Hearst.117 
C. The Seventh Circuit and Union Pacific 
The Seventh Circuit recently adopted the Ninth Circuit’s ap-
proach in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Union 
Pacific Railroad Co.118 This case arose from allegations of racial 
discrimination that two employees filed against Union Pacific af-
ter they were denied the opportunity to take tests required for 
promotion.119 After various procedural maneuverings, the EEOC 
issued right-to-sue notices to the aggrieved individuals who then 
brought a private suit.120 The EEOC meanwhile continued its own 
investigation to determine whether other individuals had been 
affected by Union Pacific’s alleged discriminatory practices.121 
Eventually, the district court dismissed the individuals’ claims, 
and Union Pacific challenged the EEOC’s ongoing efforts to en-
force its subpoenas.122 The district court rejected Union Pacific’s 
motion to dismiss, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.123 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the text of 
Title VII. Parsing the relevant language, the court first noted that 
“[t]he requirements of the statute itself are minimal.”124 It then 
echoed the Ninth Circuit in holding that, “while a valid charge is 
a requirement for beginning an EEOC investigation, nothing in 
 
 116 Id at 850 n 2, quoting Auer, 519 US 452, 461 (1997). 
 117 As in Hearst, the parties in Federal Express addressed the deference issue in their 
briefing. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v 
Federal Express Corp, No 06-16864, *28–29 (9th Cir filed Mar 9, 2007). 
 118 867 F3d 843 (7th Cir 2017). 
 119 Id at 845. 
 120 Id at 846. 
 121 Id. See also Reply Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as 
Appellee, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Union Pacific, No 15-3452, *22–
23 (7th Cir filed Nov 22, 2016). 
 122 Union Pacific, 867 F3d at 846. 
 123 Id at 846, 852. 
 124 Id at 849. 
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Title VII supports a ruling that the EEOC’s authority is then lim-
ited by the actions of the charging individual.”125  
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit emphasized prec-
edent suggesting that the EEOC’s enforcement authority exists 
wholly separate from whether individuals pursue private law-
suits. In particular, the court focused on the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Waffle 
House, Inc,126 which held that “[t]he statute clearly makes the 
EEOC the master of its case and confers on the agency the author-
ity to evaluate the strength of the public interest at stake.”127 The 
court also discussed a Seventh Circuit decision, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v Watkins Motor Lines, Inc,128 in which 
the court held that the EEOC can continue its investigation even 
after the aggrieved individual withdraws the charge she filed 
with the EEOC.129 To hold otherwise, the court said, would be “to 
limit the EEOC’s investigation to the decisions made by the 
charging individuals . . . [and] needlessly inhibit its ability to con-
duct ‘a pattern-or-practice investigation that might lead to relief 
for many persons in addition to [the charging individual].’”130  
Like the courts in Hearst and Federal Express, the Seventh 
Circuit in Union Pacific did not fully address the question of 
agency deference. But the Seventh Circuit did mention the defer-
ence issue in a footnote acknowledging that Union Pacific had 
“challenge[d] whether [§ 1601.28(a)(3)] is entitled to Chevron def-
erence based on its contrary construction of Title VII.”131 But rather 
than analyze the issue fully, the court quickly dismissed it. Like 
the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he EEOC’s 
interpretation of its own rules is entitled to deference,”132 and at 
 
 125 Id (emphasis omitted). 
 126 534 US 279 (2002). 
 127 Union Pacific, 867 F3d at 849, quoting Waffle House, 534 US at 291. 
 128 553 F3d 593 (7th Cir 2009). 
 129 Id at 596 (“Once [a valid charge] has been filed, the EEOC rather than the em-
ployee determines how the investigation proceeds.”). 
 130 Union Pacific, 867 F3d at 850, quoting Watkins Motor Lines, 553 F3d at 597. The 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the EEOC would have alternative avenues to enforce-
ment—namely commissioner’s charges and intervening in individual lawsuits. Union Pacific, 
867 F3d at 850. But it held that “the availability of alternate investigatory avenues hardly 
supports limiting the EEOC’s use of its most effective avenue, especially given that both 
alternatives could undermine the full investigatory authority of the EEOC.” Id. 
 131 Id at 850 n 5. 
 132 Id, quoting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Shell Oil Co, 466 US 
54, 74 n 28 (1984). 
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any rate, “since the court has already rejected Union Pacific’s con-
struction, this challenge completely fails to get off the ground.”133 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit also implicitly accepted the validity of 
§ 1601.28(a)(3) without further examination. 
* * * 
All three courts in this circuit split seem to think the text of 
Title VII unambiguously supports the decisions they reach. While 
there are colorable arguments to be made on both sides of the de-
bate, the better interpretation is that the conflict between Federal 
Express and Union Pacific on the one hand and Hearst on the 
other indicates statutory ambiguity.134 To resolve this ambiguity, 
and thus the circuit split, Part III analyzes what the Fifth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits ignored: the doctrine of judicial deference to 
administrative agencies. 
III.  JUSTIFYING THE EEOC’S AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AFTER 
ISSUING A RIGHT-TO-SUE NOTICE 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits split from the Fifth Circuit 
over whether the EEOC can continue to investigate a charge of 
discrimination after it issues a right-to-sue notice. Despite their 
varied holdings, one commonality is their consistent failure to ad-
dress whether § 1601.28(a)(3) is entitled to Chevron deference. 
While the Fifth Circuit ignored the regulation’s existence alto-
gether, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits tacitly accepted its validity 
without much analysis. This puzzling result deserves examination. 
One likely explanation for the circuit courts’ consistent fail-
ure to apply a formal deference regime is that Supreme Court 
precedent regarding judicial deference to the EEOC is uncer-
tain.135 Although the Supreme Court has employed Chevron-like 
reasoning in several cases involving EEOC procedural regula-
tions, it has never stated that full Chevron analysis is required.136 
Given the lack of a clear pronouncement, it is perhaps unsurpris-
ing that a circuit split has emerged. 
But this uncertainty does not by any means prove that 
Chevron deference is inappropriate in cases involving the EEOC. 
 
 133 Union Pacific, 857 F3d at 850 n 5, citing Shell Oil, 466 US at 74 n 28. 
 134 See Part III.A.5. 
 135 See Part III.A.2. 
 136 See Part III.A.2. 
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The Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of deference analy-
sis is well-documented and, as Professor William Eskridge Jr and 
Lauren Baer show, it is widespread.137 Far from being unique to 
the EEOC, the Supreme Court more often than not eschews for-
mal deference regimes in favor of ad hoc reasoning in the vein of 
traditional statutory interpretation.138 Eskridge and Baer posit 
several reasons why this might be the case, but ultimately, their 
empirical results do not “offer guidance as to why named deference 
regimes are applied to some cases and not others.”139 The authors 
nonetheless argue that the deference regimes have continued value 
and should not be abandoned.140 Whatever the reason for the 
courts’ failure to address the deference question, this Comment 
establishes that applying a formal deference regime is appropri-
ate here. 
This Part addresses the unresolved questions and fills the 
analytical gaps left by the circuit courts to resolve the circuit split. 
The analysis in Part III.A shows that § 1601.28(a)(3) is a valid 
and reasonable procedural rule that merits deference under the 
Chevron framework.141 Part III.B then shows that the EEOC’s 
practice of investigating after issuing a right-to-sue notice promotes 
the purpose and goals of Title VII and conforms with Supreme 
Court precedent on closely related topics of EEOC enforcement 
power. 
A. The EEOC’s Interpretation of Title VII in 29 CFR 
§ 1601.28(a)(3) Deserves Deference 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has not definitively an-
swered the question of how much deference courts should afford 
the EEOC’s interpretations of Title VII.142 Indeed, the Court often 
has avoided this question, opting instead to decide cases without 
addressing deference.143 When the Court has tackled the defer-
 
 137 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr and Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Def-
erence: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 Georgetown L J 1083 (2008). 
 138 See id at 1099–1100. 
 139 Id at 1141. 
 140 See id at 1091–92. 
 141 See Chevron, 467 US at 842–43. Again, the understanding of “procedural” here is 
confined to the Title VII context. See note 77. 
 142 Hart, 74 Fordham L Rev at 1941–49 (cited in note 2).  
 143 Id at 1942. 
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ence question in the EEOC context, it has applied the less defer-
ential standard laid out in Skidmore v Swift & Co144 more often 
than the more deferential regime described in Chevron.145 Despite 
this trend in past cases, the following analysis shows that courts 
should give § 1601.28(a)(3) deference under Chevron. 
This Section proceeds as follows: First, Part III.A.1 provides 
an overview of the doctrine of judicial deference. Part III.A.2 and 
Part III.A.3 then argue from a macro perspective that, in general, 
there is no categorical bar to applying Chevron deference to EEOC 
regulations. Finally, Part III.A.4 and Part III.A.5 shift to a micro 
perspective to show that Chevron deference is appropriate with 
regard to § 1601.28(a)(3) in particular. 
1. Judicial deference to administrative agencies: a 
theoretical overview. 
Which deference regime courts apply can have a profound im-
pact on the outcome of a case because the two standards—referred 
to as Skidmore deference and Chevron deference—differ consid-
erably.146 Under the Skidmore standard, courts are less deferen-
tial to agency interpretations. While the agency’s “rulings, inter-
pretations and opinions . . . constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly re-
sort for guidance,” they are not binding.147 Courts are free to sub-
stitute their own interpretation for the agency’s after considering 
“the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the va-
lidity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to per-
suade, if lacking power to control.”148  
By contrast, the higher level of deference under Chevron re-
quires courts to engage in a two-step analysis. In Step One, courts 
ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter.”149 However, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue,” then courts move on to Step Two, 
 
 144 323 US 134 (1944). 
 145 See Hart, 74 Fordham L Rev at 1942 (cited in note 2). 
 146 Note, however, that some scholars question whether the different deference re-
gimes lead to different outcomes in practice. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 
Va L Rev 135, 153–55 (2010). 
 147 Skidmore, 323 US at 140. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Chevron, 467 US at 842. 
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which asks “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute.”150 In other words, Step Two asks 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. As long as it 
is, courts defer to the agency’s view even if they think a different 
interpretation might be better.151 
Determining which standard to apply is a complicated matter 
that has sparked rigorous debate between Supreme Court jus-
tices.152 In answering this question, courts now commonly apply 
what is known as Chevron Step Zero. This analysis asks whether 
Congress intended to give the agency authority to interpret the 
statute in question. If the answer is yes, the court moves on to the 
two-step Chevron analysis. If the answer is no, the court instead 
applies the less deferential Skidmore standard.153 Chevron Step 
Zero thus provides a gatekeeping function to determine whether 
courts reach the Chevron analysis at all. 
The Supreme Court has developed two sets of factors to con-
sider at the Step Zero inquiry. The first set comes from United 
States v Mead Corp.154 Under Mead, the key inquiry is whether 
“Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law” and whether the agency acted pur-
suant to that authority.155 The most important factor in this anal-
ysis is whether Congress authorized the agency to engage in for-
mal rulemaking or adjudication, or informal rulemaking 
pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures.156 But the Mead 
 
 150 Id at 843. 
 151 See, for example, Entergy Corp v Riverkeeper, Inc, 556 US 208, 218 (2009) (“[The 
agency’s] view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not necessarily 
the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by 
the courts.”) (emphasis omitted). See also Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law 
and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases 256 (Wolters Kluwer 8th ed 2017) (not-
ing that courts “almost never” invalidate an agency decision at Step Two). 
 152 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187, 198–205 (2006) (de-
scribing the back-and-forth debate between Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Antonin 
Scalia in a string of cases). 
 153 See Christensen v Harris County, 529 US 576, 587 (2000) (holding that, in the 
absence of Chevron deference, agency interpretations still merit Skidmore deference to the 
extent that they “have the power to persuade”), quoting Skidmore, 323 US at 140.  
 154 533 US 218 (2001). 
 155 Id at 226–27. As Professor Cass Sunstein summarizes the Step Zero analysis un-
der Mead, “if agencies have been given power to use relatively formal procedures, and if 
they have exercised that power, they are entitled to Chevron deference.” Sunstein, 92 Va 
L Rev at 214 (cited in note 152). 
 156 Mead, 533 US at 229 (noting that the ability to engage in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or formal adjudication is “a very good indicator of [congressional] delegation 
meriting Chevron treatment”). 
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Court made clear that formal agency action and notice-and-com-
ment procedures are not prerequisites for Chevron deference.157 
Other factors like the language of the statute, how many parties 
are bound by the agency interpretation, the precedential value of 
the interpretation, and the number of interpretations the agency 
issues also can indicate congressional intent.158 
The second set of factors comes from Barnhart v Walton.159 In 
upholding an agency regulation that had been issued through in-
formal means, the Barnhart Court said that Step Zero turned in 
large part on “the interpretive method used and the nature of the 
question at issue.”160 The factors in this inquiry, the Court said, 
include “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related 
expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to admin-
istration of the statute, the complexity of that administration,” 
how carefully the agency has considered the question, and for how 
long a period.161 
2. Judicial deference to EEOC procedural regulations: the 
experience in practice. 
The Supreme Court has not articulated a clear theory of defer-
ence to EEOC regulations under Title VII.162 It is well established 
that EEOC regulations that interpret the substance of Title VII 
never merit Chevron deference because, under Title VII, the EEOC 
has authority only to issue procedural regulations.163 But despite the 
 
 157 Id at 230–31. 
 158 Id at 232–34. 
 159 535 US 212 (2002). 
 160 Id at 222. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See Hart, 74 Fordham L Rev at 1945 (cited in note 2) (“Despite the fact that Title VII, 
the ADA, and the ADEA all explicitly grant some rulemaking authority to the EEOC, the 
Court has applied Chevron deference in only two antidiscrimination cases, one under the 
ADA and one under the ADEA.”). See also Tessa M. Register, Note, The Case for Deferring 
to the EEOC’s Interpretations in Macy and Foxx to Classify LGBT Discrimination As Sex 
Discrimination under Title VII, 102 Iowa L Rev 1397, 1419 (2017) (“When interpreting 
workplace discrimination statutes, the Supreme Court has historically opted to ‘chart its 
own course’ rather than defer to the EEOC’s expertise.”); Sam DePrimio, Special Delivery: 
Young v. United Parcel Service Revives the Pregnancy Discrimination Act while Denying 
Life to EEOC Guidance, 67 Admin L Rev 389, 406 (2015) (noting that current Supreme 
Court precedent “leaves an open question as to the deference the Court will grant to [the] 
EEOC”). 
 163 See notes 74–76 and accompanying text. In theory, the EEOC’s substantive regu-
lations could merit Skidmore deference. But in practice, courts almost always strike them 
down. See Hart, 74 Fordham L Rev at 1948 (cited in note 2) (noting that the Supreme Court 
has applied Skidmore and upheld an EEOC regulation in only two cases). See also General 
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Court’s hostility to EEOC regulations interpreting the substance 
of Title VII, the Court has shown willingness to defer to the 
EEOC’s procedural regulations. In Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v Commercial Office Products Co164 and Edelman v 
Lynchburg College,165 for example, majorities of the Court applied 
logic resembling that of Chevron to uphold EEOC interpretations 
of Title VII, and concurring opinions in both cases advocated ex-
plicitly for Chevron deference.166 
The Court’s analysis in Commercial Office closely mirrored 
that of Chevron. The dispute in Commercial Office concerned the 
EEOC’s interpretation that, under Title VII, a state antidiscrim-
ination agency “terminated” its proceedings when it waived its 
right to initially process a charge of discrimination.167 After find-
ing that the language of Title VII was ambiguous, the Court held 
that the EEOC’s interpretation was not only reasonable, but also 
“more than amply supported by the legislative history of the de-
ferral provisions of Title VII, the purposes of those provisions, and 
the language of other sections of the Act.”168 
The Court also upheld a procedural regulation in Edelman. 
At issue was an EEOC regulation allowing individuals to amend 
their charge to add the required verification by oath or affirma-
tion after the filing period had expired.169 As long as the initial 
charge was timely filed, the EEOC regulation provided that the 
verification would relate back to the time of the original filing.170 
Writing for the Edelman Court, Justice David Souter rejected the 
employer’s argument that the EEOC’s regulation unlawfully al-
tered the substantive requirements Congress laid out in Title VII. 
Drawing a distinction between procedure and substance,171 the 
 
Electric Co v Gilbert, 429 US 125, 141 (1976) (noting that the EEOC lacks authority to prom-
ulgate substantive regulations and applying Skidmore deference to strike down the 
EEOC’s substantive guideline); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian 
American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 257 (1991) (rejecting the EEOC’s substantive interpretation 
of Title VII). 
 164 486 US 107 (1988). 
 165 535 US 106 (2002). 
 166 See Commercial Office, 486 US at 125–26 (O’Connor concurring); Edelman, 535 
US at 120–24 (O’Connor concurring). 
 167 Commercial Office, 486 US at 112–13. 
 168 Id at 115–16. 
 169 Edelman, 535 US at 109. 
 170 Id at 109–10. 
 171 Id at 113. The Court addressed the procedure-substance distinction in both 
Commercial Office and Edelman, but the justices did not discuss where the dividing line 
fell. Instead, they simply accepted that the regulations at issue were sufficiently procedural 
to fall within 42 USC § 2000e-12(a). See Edelman, 535 US at 114, 117–18; Edelman, 535 
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Court held that the relevant statutory provision was ambiguous 
and “open to interpretation”172 and that the EEOC did not exceed 
“its authority to adopt ‘suitable procedural regulations’” under 42 
USC § 2000e-12(a).173 The Court then moved to the second issue: 
what level of deference to give to the EEOC regulation. The Court 
initially invoked Mead’s principle that Chevron does not always 
require formal agency action or notice-and-comment proce-
dures.174 But rather than pursue the inquiry further, the Court 
abruptly announced that there was “no need to resolve any ques-
tion of deference” because it found “the EEOC rule not only a rea-
sonable one, but the position we would adopt even if there were 
no formal rule and we were interpreting the statute from 
scratch.”175 
While the majorities in Commercial Office and Edelman im-
plicitly support the view that the EEOC’s procedural regulations 
merit high deference from courts, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
concurrences in both cases make the case explicitly. In Commercial 
Office, O’Connor agreed with the majority that, “in light of the 
statute’s language, structure, and legislative history, sufficient 
ambiguity exists to warrant deference to the agency’s construction 
of the word ‘terminated’ in § 706(c) [of Title VII]. Indeed, deference 
is particularly appropriate on this type of technical issue of agency 
procedure.”176 O’Connor was even more explicit in Edelman: “I do 
not agree that the EEOC has adopted the most natural interpreta-
tion of Title VII’s provisions regarding the filing with the EEOC of 
charges of discrimination. . . . But, because the statute is at least 
somewhat ambiguous, I would defer to the agency’s interpreta-
tion.”177 In support, O’Connor cited Chevron as well as her concur-
rence in Commercial Office.178 
 
US at 119 (Thomas concurring); Edelman, 535 US at 120 (O’Connor concurring); Commercial 
Office, 486 US at 125 (O’Connor concurring). 
 172 Edelman, 535 US at 113. 
 173 Id at 113, citing Arabian American Oil, 499 US at 257 and General Electric, 429 
US at 141. 
 174 Edelman, 535 US at 114, citing Mead, 533 US at 230–31. 
 175 Edelman, 535 US at 114. Like the circuit court decisions described in Part II, one 
possible reading of this holding is that the Court found the statute unambiguous, thus 
resolving the question at Step One. But because the Court emphasized the reasonableness 
of the EEOC’s interpretation rather than the absolute textual clarity of Title VII, the bet-
ter reading is that the Court implicitly found statutory ambiguity at Step One and upheld 
the regulation at Step Two. Regardless, either reading supports the view that Chevron 
analysis is the proper lens for EEOC procedural regulations. 
 176 Commercial Office, 486 US at 125 (O’Connor concurring). 
 177 Edelman, 535 US at 120 (O’Connor concurring). 
 178 Id. 
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3. EEOC procedural regulations can merit Chevron 
deference. 
The structure of Title VII and relevant precedent show that, in 
the abstract, EEOC procedural regulations that interpret Title VII 
merit Chevron deference. As Part III.A.1 discusses, an agency in-
terpretation merits Chevron deference only if it satisfies Step 
Zero,179 which asks whether Congress delegated authority to the 
agency to make rules carrying the force of law and whether the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was issued as an exer-
cise of that authority.180 It is an open question whether the EEOC 
has such authority under Title VII, as the previous Section 
demonstrates, but several Supreme Court cases suggest that it 
does with regard to its procedural rules.181 Likewise, several 
scholars and lower courts have provided convincing analyses 
demonstrating that EEOC procedural regulations can carry the 
force of law.182 
Professor Rebecca Hanner White argues persuasively that, 
although the EEOC’s lack of substantive rulemaking or adjudica-
tory authority is “dispositive” as to whether the EEOC can inter-
pret substantive rules, it is not so with regard to its procedural 
ones.183 Channeling the logic of the Barnhart factors, White argues 
that properly answering whether Congress meant to delegate the 
power to create rules with the force of law requires a considera-
tion of the full weight of evidence, including the legislative record 
and “other factors generally regarded as useful,”184 to determine 
whether it “makes sense” within the overall statutory scheme for 
 
 179 See notes 152–61 and accompanying text. 
 180 Mead, 533 US at 226–27. 
 181 See Part III.A.2. 
 182 See White, 1995 Utah L Rev at 92–99 (cited in note 16); Sims v Trus Joist MacMillan, 
22 F3d 1059, 1062 (11th Cir 1994). 
 183 See White, 1995 Utah L Rev at 58, 95 (cited in note 16). White advocates for a 
broader view of EEOC deference than the position this Comment takes. Her view would 
afford deference to all EEOC pronouncements, including interpretive guidelines. See id at 
102–07. However, the Supreme Court rejected such a broad view in a series of cases known 
as the Step Zero Trilogy. See Sunstein, 92 Va L Rev at 211–19 (cited in note 152). For 
example, in Christensen, the first Trilogy case, the Court held that “[i]nterpretations such 
as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant 
Chevron-style deference.” Christensen, 529 US at 587. This Comment adopts a much nar-
rower position, advocating only that the EEOC’s procedural rules issued pursuant to 42 
USC § 2000e-12 merit deference. 
 184 White, 1995 Utah L Rev at 97 (cited in note 16). White’s argument closely mirrors 
the factors the Court later adopted in Barnhart, like uniformity of the law, agency exper-
tise, and the nature of the question at issue. Id at 97–99. 
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the EEOC to have such power.185 These factors cut strongly in fa-
vor of judicial deference to the EEOC’s procedural rules. First, 
White traces Title VII’s legislative history to show that, unlike 
other elements of the statute that were more contentious, the 
question of EEOC rulemaking authority “has never been the ob-
ject of sustained congressional debate.”186 The debates on those 
other issues—for example, the EEOC’s ability to initiate a law-
suit—resulted in the various restrictions Congress placed on the 
EEOC’s enforcement powers.187 By comparison, White argues that 
“one would have expected some debate” if Congress had intended 
to limit the EEOC’s interpretative powers as well.188 Deferring to 
the EEOC’s interpretation also satisfies the Barnhart factor fa-
voring a uniform system in an important area of law and incorpo-
rates EEOC expertise that is “unmatched by the courts.”189  
Moreover, the enforcement powers Congress enumerated in 
Title VII “necessarily envisioned the need for agency interpreta-
tion.”190 Title VII essentially consists of three major elements: 
(1) Congress’s substantive notions about what constitutes em-
ployment discrimination,191 (2) a broad framework for how the en-
forcement procedure should operate,192 and (3) a residual clause 
allowing the EEOC to issue procedural rules necessary to carry 
out the broad purposes of the statute.193 In other words, Congress 
specifically dictated the what of employment discrimination, but 
it largely left the how up to the EEOC, provided the agency stays 
within Title VII’s broad framework. By vesting the EEOC with 
broad investigatory power, a duty to attempt conciliation, and, fi-
nally, a direct prosecutorial role in antidiscrimination lawsuits, 
Congress impliedly granted the EEOC the authority to interpret 
the statute and determine how best to fulfill each role. Otherwise, 
“the EEOC’s views of what the statute means are without force,” 
and its enforcement efforts “become[ ] perfunctory until the courts 
resolve the statutory issue.”194 The interpretations embodied in 
 
 185 Id at 97. In making this assertion, White drew on the scholarship of then-Professor 
Stephen Breyer. See also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 
38 Admin L Rev 363, 370 (1986). 
 186 White, 1995 Utah L Rev at 95 (cited in note 16). 
 187 See Part I.A. 
 188 White, 1995 Utah L Rev at 95–96 (cited in note 16) (emphasis omitted). 
 189 Id at 97–98. 
 190 Id at 97. 
 191 See 42 USC §§ 2000e-2–2000e-3. 
 192 See 42 USC §§ 2000e-4–2000e-6, 2000e-8. 
 193 See 42 USC § 2000e-12(a). 
 194 White, 1995 Utah L Rev at 96 (cited in note 16). 
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the EEOC’s procedural regulations therefore further satisfy Step 
Zero under Barnhart because they are necessary to answer the 
interstitial questions that arise in the daily administration of the 
statute.195 
Arguments that the EEOC’s regulations always fail Step Zero 
are unpersuasive. Authors taking this position sometimes argue 
that courts historically have shown less deference to the EEOC than 
to other agencies.196 From this premise, they assert that because 
courts typically apply Skidmore deference to EEOC regulations, 
that must be the proper standard.197 But this argument is conclu-
sory and ignores the endogeneity of the procedure-substance is-
sue within those cases. Indeed, in General Electric Co v Gilbert198 
and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian 
American Oil Co199—two cases that proponents of this argument 
often cite—the Court struck down EEOC interpretations because 
they reached the substance of Title VII. These cases therefore 
shed little light on how courts should treat the EEOC’s procedural 
rules.200 
Professor Nancy Modesitt falls into a similar trap. She claims 
that “even the EEOC’s interpretations of Title VII created using 
formal procedures are entitled to, at most, Skidmore deference, not 
Chevron deference,”201 because “Congress did not ‘give[ ] rulemak-
ing authority to interpret the substantive provisions of Title VII.’”202 
Puzzlingly, Modesitt cites Edelman to support this claim. But as 
the previous Section analyzed,203 rather than condemning all 
EEOC interpretations, the Court in Edelman distinguished “suit-
able procedural regulations” from “substantive issue[s] over 
which the EEOC has no rulemaking power.”204 In drawing this 
distinction, the Court strongly implied its favorable view of the 
former category. 
 
 195 See notes 159–61 and accompanying text. See also Breyer, 38 Admin L Rev at 370 
(cited in note 185). 
 196 See, for example, Dunn, Comment, 63 Emory L J at 482–83 (cited in note 57).  
 197 Id at 483–84. 
 198 429 US 125 (1976). 
 199 499 US 244 (1991).  
 200 See DePrimio, 67 Admin L Rev at 406 (cited in note 162) (questioning the prece-
dential value of Arabian American Oil and Gilbert). 
 201 Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing Battle between Courts 
and Agencies over the Right to Interpret Federal Law, 74 Mo L Rev 949, 976 (2009). 
 202 Id at 977, quoting Edelman, 535 US at 122 (O’Connor concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
 203 See notes 165–78 and accompanying text. 
 204 Edelman, 535 US at 113. 
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The great weight of evidence shows that the EEOC’s proce-
dural rules issued pursuant to 42 USC § 2000e-12 can be entitled 
to deference. Although the rulemaking power Congress granted 
the EEOC falls decidedly short of conventional substantive legis-
lative rules, the EEOC’s procedural rules nonetheless are “rule[s] 
within the agency’s special ken and competence, as recognized by 
Congress in its organic statute.”205 Analyzing the Step Zero factors 
demonstrates that Congress impliedly delegated interpretative 
authority to the EEOC to facilitate its broad enforcement powers 
under Title VII. 
4. Applying Chevron Step Zero to 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3). 
While the previous Sections establish that, in general, EEOC 
procedural regulations can merit Chevron deference, this Section 
shows that § 1601.28(a)(3) in particular satisfies Step Zero be-
cause it is a procedural regulation that carries the force of law.206 
Several factors from Mead and Barnhart show that 
§ 1601.28(a)(3) carries the force of law. First, and most im-
portantly, § 1601.28(a)(3) was adopted via notice-and-comment 
procedures pursuant to its explicit authority to adopt procedural 
rules.207 On its face, this fact alone may satisfy Step Zero under 
Mead because such rulemaking shows that Congress delegated 
the authority to make rules carrying the force of law, and the 
EEOC acted on this authority.208 Looking to Barnhart, 
§ 1601.28(a)(3) also represents a longstanding interpretation that 
has remained in place since the EEOC promulgated the regula-
tion in 1974,209 and the determination of when a continued inves-
tigation serves the purposes of Title VII draws considerably on 
the EEOC’s particularized expertise.210 These factors suggest that 
this question is well suited for Chevron analysis.211 Moreover, the 
regulation simply states that the EEOC can continue investigating 
 
 205 Barry Sullivan, On the Borderlands of Chevron’s Empire: An Essay on Title VII, Agency 
Procedures and Priorities, and the Power of Judicial Review, 62 La L Rev 317, 325 (2002). 
 206 One article has explicitly, but briefly, addressed whether 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3) 
is procedural. See Shawn D. Twing and Travis Odom, Invoking Agency Jurisdiction in 
Employment Law Cases, 10 Tex Tech Admin L J 369, 400 (2009). The extent of the article’s 
analysis argues that “this particular regulation is probably entitled to Chevron deference” 
because Congress gave the EEOC power to issue “suitable procedural regulations to carry 
out the provisions of’ Title VII.” Id (citations and emphasis omitted). 
 207 See Part I.D. 
 208 See notes 154–58 and accompanying text. 
 209 See generally Issuance of Notices of Right-to-sue, 39 Fed Reg 10178 (1974). 
 210 See notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
 211 See Part III.A.1. 
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a charge of employment discrimination as long as it “effectuate[s] 
the purpose of title VII.”212 It does not purport to interpret what 
constitutes an unlawful employment practice, nor does it attempt 
to change the substantive obligations imposed by Title VII. In-
stead, it addresses interstitial questions regarding the EEOC’s 
internal functioning.213 
Courts’ treatment of other EEOC interpretations confirms 
the procedural nature of § 1601.28(a)(3). In General Electric, the 
Supreme Court rejected EEOC guidelines that sought to bring 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and childbirth within 
the purview of sex discrimination under Title VII.214 Similarly, in 
Arabian American Oil, the Court rebuffed the EEOC’s interpre-
tation that Title VII’s jurisdiction extended to employers outside 
the United States.215 Both of these cases dealt with EEOC inter-
pretations that went to the substance of Title VII. In sharp con-
trast, the Court upheld the EEOC’s procedural interpretations in 
Commercial Office and Edelman, which respectively addressed 
when a state antidiscrimination agency “terminated” its proceed-
ings and whether an aggrieved individual’s amended charge could 
relate back to the date the initial charge was filed.216 These two 
pairs of cases highlight a key distinction that runs through the 
Court’s jurisprudence: EEOC interpretations regarding what it 
can enforce are impermissibly substantive, while interpretations 
of how it can enforce are procedural. Section 1601.28(a)(3) falls in 
the latter category and is far more similar to the procedural reg-
ulations upheld in Commercial Office and Edelman.217 
Opponents of this view might counter that § 1601.28(a)(3) is 
not actually procedural because the EEOC’s decision to investigate 
can significantly impact rights and obligations under Title VII. 
This argument is as incorrect as it is unconvincing. Legal schol-
arship firmly recognizes that procedural rules inherently impact 
substantive outcomes.218 The EEOC’s decisions to continue an in-
vestigation pursuant to § 1601.28(a)(3) are no exception. But the 
 
 212 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3). 
 213 See notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
 214 General Electric, 429 US at 140–41, 145–46. 
 215 Arabian American Oil, 499 US at 257–59. 
 216 See Part III.A.2. See also Commercial Office, 486 US at 112–13; Edelman, 535 US 
at 109. 
 217 See Part III.A.2. 
 218 See Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 Wash U 
L Rev 801, 803 (2010) (discussing “the familiar narrative about how procedure is inher-
ently substantive” and how “procedure affects the outcome of cases”). 
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mere existence of a downstream impact on substance is not suffi-
cient to invalidate an otherwise permissible procedural rule.219 
Rather, the question should be one of degree: Does the procedural 
rule impact substance too much? Drawing this line can be diffi-
cult, especially when, as in the EEOC context, courts have not 
discussed the question at length.220 In this situation, comparison 
and analogy emerge as highly effective tools. And again, compar-
ing § 1601.28(a)(3) with the decidedly procedural regulations up-
held in Commercial Office and Edelman and the decidedly sub-
stantive regulations struck down in General Electric and Arabian 
American Oil confirms that § 1601.28(a)(3) falls on the procedural 
side of the line. 
5. Applying Chevron analysis to 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3). 
Since § 1601.28(a)(3) is procedural and satisfies Step Zero, it 
should be analyzed under the Chevron framework rather than the 
less deferential Skidmore regime.221 The inquiry thus moves to 
Chevron’s two-step analysis, which asks (1) whether the statute 
at issue clearly expresses Congress’s intent and (2) whether the 
regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. If the reg-
ulation fails at either step, it does not merit deference. 
At Step One, courts draw on all tools of statutory interpreta-
tion, examining the statute’s text, structure, and purpose; the leg-
islative history; and subsequent legislative enactments.222 Start-
ing with the text, nothing in Title VII explicitly answers whether 
the EEOC loses its authority to investigate once it issues a right-
to-sue notice. One might interpret this silence to imply affirmative 
authorization since Title VII does restrict other aspects of EEOC 
enforcement.223 Indeed, both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits seem 
to have adopted the view that Title VII unambiguously empow-
ered the EEOC to continue investigation after issuing a right-to-
 
 219 See Edelman, 535 US at 113 (rejecting the employer’s argument that the EEOC’s 
procedural rule was invalid because it altered “a substantive requirement included by 
Congress in the statute”). 
 220 See note 171. 
 221 See Part III.A.1. 
 222 See, for example, Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp, 529 US 120, 133 (2000). 
 223 The expressio unius canon of interpretation dictates that the inclusion of one item 
implies the exclusion of other items not mentioned. See, for example, William N. Eskridge, 
et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation: Statutes and the Creation of 
Public Policy 668 (West 5th ed 2014). 
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sue notice.224 But the better reading is that this silence reflects 
ambiguity, as demonstrated by the conflict between Federal Express 
and Union Pacific on the one hand and Hearst on the other. In 
Hearst, the Fifth Circuit correctly identified that Title VII con-
tains time restrictions and jurisdictional triggers that collectively 
could suggest congressional desire to limit the EEOC’s power. Yet 
neither the structure nor purpose of the statute suggest congres-
sional intent to restrain the EEOC’s investigations.225 To the con-
trary, the structure of Title VII’s enforcement mechanism empha-
sizes that the EEOC’s investigatory authority is broad in order to 
foster conciliation and avoid litigation.226 
The legislative history is similarly indeterminate regarding 
the impact of right-to-sue notices. The legislative record does 
show that Congress intentionally restrained the EEOC’s inde-
pendent enforcement power by limiting its ability to bring civil 
actions and making an individual charge of discrimination a ju-
risdictional prerequisite to EEOC action.227 But there is no indi-
cation that Congress intended similar restraints on the EEOC’s 
investigatory powers, and no provision speaks extensively about 
right-to-sue notices. Here, as in Chevron, “the legislative history 
as a whole is silent on the precise issue,” but it is “consistent with 
the view that the [agency] should have broad discretion.”228 The 
fact that Congress steadily increased the EEOC’s authority over 
time further supports this view.229 Ultimately, these arguments 
and counterarguments underscore Title VII’s ambiguity. 
Because the statute is ambiguous, satisfying Step One, the 
analysis finally turns to Step Two. Applying Step Two, the 
EEOC’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference because 
§ 1601.28(a)(3) is reasonable. Chevron’s reasonableness standard 
is similar to the substantive component of traditional arbitrary 
and capricious review.230 Here, the regulation is reasonable be-
cause it draws on agency expertise and falls within the broad dis-
cretion that Title VII and the Supreme Court have afforded the 
EEOC to investigate systemic employment discrimination.231 
 
 224 See Part II.B and Part II.C. 
 225 See Part III.B. 
 226 See Part III.B. 
 227 See Parts I.A and I.B. 
 228 Chevron, 467 US at 862. 
 229 See Part I.A. 
 230 Chevron, 467 US at 844. 
 231 See notes 45–49 and accompanying text.  
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Given the text of Title VII and the EEOC’s broad discretion to de-
termine what serves the public interest, there is no blanket pro-
hibition on post–right-to-sue notice investigations.232 Even if a 
court believes that a different interpretation is better than the 
EEOC’s, that does not undermine the reasonableness of 
§ 1601.28(a)(3).233 
The sole other article that explicitly discusses this circuit 
split argues that § 1601.28(a)(3) fails at Step Two because it is 
arbitrary and capricious on two grounds. First, the authors—
Shawn Twing and Travis Odom—claim that Congress “did not in-
tend for the [EEOC’s] investigation to go on indefinitely.”234 Sec-
ond, the authors argue that “the primary purpose of Title VII is 
to trigger the investigatory and conciliatory procedures . . . to 
achieve non-judicial resolution of employment discrimination 
claims” and that “[t]his purpose is not served at all by allowing 
the EEOC to continue investigating an employer on the basis of a 
charge already being litigated.”235 
Neither of these arguments is convincing. As to the first, the 
authors’ concerns about a wholly unrestrained EEOC conducting 
never-ending investigations would be justified if those fears were 
realistic. But they are not. Section 1601.28(a)(3) allows the EEOC 
to investigate only so long as it “effectuate[s] the purpose” of 
Title VII.236 This key qualification provides employers with a 
ground to challenge—and courts with a means to police—an 
EEOC investigation that improperly extends beyond the issuance 
of a right-to-sue notice. Thus, even in the world this Comment 
envisions, employers retain meaningful checks to prevent over-
zealous EEOC officials from running amok. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has already made clear that 
there is no strict temporal limit on the EEOC’s enforcement au-
thority, despite the 180-day period described in the statute.237 
 
 232 See General Telephone, 446 US at 331. 
 233 See notes 150–51 and accompanying text. More pragmatically, arguments to the 
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Just as Title VII imposes no requirement that the EEOC “con-
clude its conciliation efforts and bring an enforcement suit within 
any maximum period of time,”238 it also should not be read to im-
pose an arbitrary temporal cap on the EEOC’s investigatory pow-
ers. This view is supported further by the fact that there is no 
time limit for commissioner’s charges. 
The second argument, that allowing the EEOC to continue in-
vestigating fails to promote extrajudicial resolution of disputes, also 
fails because it underestimates the EEOC’s duty under Title VII 
to “vindicate the public interest in preventing employment dis-
crimination.”239 When an aggrieved individual brings a private 
civil action, she pursues her narrow self-interest, which is likely 
to diverge from that of the greater public. Despite Twing and 
Odom’s assertion to the contrary,240 the EEOC still has a strong 
interest in completing its investigation to determine whether the 
employer has engaged in systemic or widespread patterns or prac-
tices of employment discrimination. Given its broader mission, 
the EEOC is better positioned to address such patterns or prac-
tices than an individual’s lawsuit, which has a narrow scope lim-
ited to the parties involved. And in the long term, allowing EEOC 
investigations to continue could lead to less litigation overall—
thereby satisfying the purpose of Title VII—because the EEOC 
could address the widespread discriminatory practices in one fell 
swoop, eliminating the need for redundant, time-consuming indi-
vidual lawsuits filed by each affected employee. 
Twing and Odom also fail to distinguish controlling Supreme 
Court precedent.241 They try to mitigate the force of the Court’s 
holding in Waffle House that Title VII “makes the EEOC the mas-
ter of its own case.”242 But that decision should be read in conjunc-
tion with the Court’s earlier statement in Occidental that nothing 
in Title VII requires the EEOC to conclude its enforcement efforts 
“within any maximum period of time.”243 Together, these holdings 
confirm the vast control the EEOC exercises over its enforcement 
procedures. 
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* * * 
On balance, the Step Zero factors and the Chevron analysis 
indicate that § 1601.28(a)(3) deserves Chevron deference. Congress 
explicitly gave the EEOC power to issue procedural rules and im-
plicitly authorized those rules to fill the gaps and ambiguities left 
in Title VII’s enforcement procedure. The EEOC did just that 
when it enacted § 1601.28(a)(3) via notice and comment. The 
EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII does not conflict with the stat-
ute’s text, it is a reasonable interpretation of Congress’s intent, 
and it accomplishes the broad antidiscrimination goals enshrined 
in Title VII. As such, courts should defer to § 1601.28(a)(3) under 
Chevron. 
B. Continued EEOC Investigations Further the Purpose of 
Title VII 
Restricting the EEOC’s ability to investigate is antithetical 
to the goals of Title VII because it would stifle conciliation efforts. 
The legislative history demonstrates Congress’s intent that con-
ciliation be the first and preferred tool used to rectify employment 
discrimination. And courts have repeatedly affirmed its centrality 
to the Title VII scheme.244 
The Supreme Court recently reiterated the importance of con-
ciliation in Mach Mining, LLC v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.245 In Mach Mining, the Court considered whether 
the conciliation efforts the EEOC conducted before bringing a 
civil action against the employer were sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements under Title VII.246 In response, the EEOC argued that 
its conciliation efforts should not be subject to judicial review.247 
Although the Court recognized the “expansive discretion that Ti-
tle VII gives to the EEOC” in pursuing conciliation efforts, it re-
jected the notion that courts could not review the EEOC’s actions 
to ensure compliance with the requirements of Title VII.248 In so 
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holding, the Court emphasized that conciliation is “a key compo-
nent of the statutory scheme”249 and that “Congress chose ‘[c]oop-
eration and voluntary compliance’ as its ‘preferred means’” to 
eliminate employment discrimination.250 
Because conciliation flows from the EEOC’s investigation, 
limiting the EEOC’s investigative power would cause practical 
difficulties that would undermine its antidiscrimination efforts. 
If the issuance of a right-to-sue notice terminates the EEOC’s in-
vestigatory authority and a charging individual requests a right-
to-sue notice before the EEOC finishes its investigation, the 
EEOC is left with few options, all of which are inadequate. Absent 
the results from a rich and full investigation, the EEOC would 
find it difficult to persuade a recalcitrant employer to accept sat-
isfactory terms of conciliation. Terminating the EEOC’s ability to 
investigate is therefore likely to push the EEOC prematurely to-
ward more litigation. Worse, such a rule might compel the EEOC 
to drop enforcement on those charges altogether, greatly increas-
ing the threat that discriminatory practices will go undiscovered 
and unchallenged. Either of these outcomes undermines the pur-
pose of Title VII and should be avoided. 
The alternative enforcement options the Fifth Circuit sug-
gests in Hearst are not suitable replacements for the ability to 
conduct an investigation. In Hearst, the Fifth Circuit suggested 
that without the ability to investigate, the EEOC still would be 
able to file a commissioner’s charge or intervene in the aggrieved 
individual’s lawsuit.251 But as the Seventh Circuit noted in Union 
Pacific, these alternatives present additional procedural hurdles 
that complicate enforcement. For example, “a Commissioner’s 
charge filed after issuance of a notice of right-to-sue may be 
deemed untimely,”252 especially if the investigation has been in 
progress for a substantial period of time. More significantly, com-
missioner’s charges are rarely used and often wrapped up in pol-
itics.253 EEOC commissioners are political appointees, nominated 
by the president and confirmed by the Senate to five-year 
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terms.254 And while Title VII guarantees rough partisan bal-
ance—of the five commissioners, no more than three may be affil-
iated with the same political party255—that does not insulate com-
missioners from political influence. History shows that Congress 
has been willing to pull the purse strings closed or refuse to con-
firm a nominee when it disapproves of the agency’s activities.256 
The fact that the composition of Congress and the White House, 
and therefore the EEOC commissioners, changes from election to 
election exacerbates these problems of “money and politics.”257 
The EEOC field offices, however, typically are staffed by career 
civil servants.258 This dynamic presents the possibility, and often 
the reality, that the EEOC field offices would choose to pursue 
cases that the EEOC commissioners in Washington, DC would 
drop.259 The realization that the commissioner’s charge process 
may be tainted by politics underscores the Seventh Circuit’s con-
cern that they are not a viable replacement for regular charge 
processing in the field offices, which are more insulated from such 
influences. 
The possibility of intervening in an individual lawsuit is sim-
ilarly constraining. The EEOC does not have a right to intervene; 
it can do so only at the discretion of the court.260 In addition to 
undermining Title VII’s goal of resolving employment discrimina-
tion suits out of court, requiring the EEOC to intervene, rather 
than allowing it to continue its investigation, inserts the judiciary 
in the middle of antidiscrimination efforts that Title VII meant to 
place within the responsibility of the EEOC.261 Even when courts 
allow the EEOC to intervene, its ability to gather information 
likely would be restrained by limitations on discovery not present 
when the EEOC conducts an investigation outside of court.262 
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Eliminating the EEOC’s authority to investigate after it is-
sues a right-to-sue notice risks placing a serious restraint on the 
agency’s ability to police discriminatory employment practices. 
The issue explored in this Comment appears to have emerged in-
frequently, but that could simply reflect a lack of reporting or a 
lack of appeals. More concerning, the frequency could increase 
dramatically if the Fifth Circuit’s approach became the law of the 
land. If that were to happen, it would force the EEOC to rely on 
the alternatives touted in Hearst and would insert politics and 
procedural speedbumps into the process, placing additional hur-
dles in the way of an already resource-strapped agency.263 As the 
Seventh Circuit held, “[T]he availability of alternate investiga-
tory avenues hardly supports limiting the EEOC’s use of its most 
effective avenue.”264 This statement is especially true here be-
cause the alternatives “could undermine the full investigatory au-
thority of the EEOC.”265 
CONCLUSION 
The EEOC’s ability to investigate claims of discrimination is 
fundamental to the federal government’s scheme to eliminate em-
ployment discrimination. Although concerns about ensuring swift 
resolution of charges and preventing a mountainous backlog of 
cases are legitimate, placing more limits on an already restricted 
agency seems a curious, and likely ineffective, solution. The bet-
ter route, and the one adopted by the EEOC, is to maximize the 
EEOC’s investigatory authority within the bounds of Title VII. 
The EEOC’s interpretation of its investigatory powers, as en-
shrined in § 1601.28(a)(3), is a valid exercise of the procedural 
rulemaking authority Congress granted. Therefore, the EEOC is 
entitled to deference from the judiciary. Although courts often 
have been skeptical of EEOC regulations, their hostility largely 
has been confined to the EEOC’s attempts to issue substantive 
regulations. By contrast, the Supreme Court has upheld the le-
gality of EEOC procedural regulations in several cases. Recogniz-
ing the validity of § 1601.28(a)(3)—indeed, awarding it the full 
measure of Chevron deference that it deserves—is neither a major 
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shift in precedent nor policy. Rather, the result this Comment ad-
vocates affirms decades of practice, comports with the courts’ gen-
erally broad view of EEOC enforcement powers, and enables the 
agency to carry out the vital antidiscrimination mission it has 
been tasked to accomplish. 
